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Alt 03-11-2006, 17:24   #58
Benjamin
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Russia plays a double game over Iran
By Kaveh L Afrasiabi
Nov 4, 2006


A draft United Nations resolution calling for sanctions on Iran has been dealt a severe blow by China and Russia and, given the absence of any evidence of nuclear-weapons proliferation by Iran, the momentum for UN action against Iran has begun to fizzle. This raises the possibility that Iran's nuclear dossier may return to its proper venue - the UN's nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The Moscow-Beijing duet against sanctions follows the argument
that as long as Iran's nuclear activities, sanctioned by the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), are under the IAEA's inspection regime
and lack any evidence of military diversion, the justification for punitive measures by the United Nations is lacking.

Of the two, China has now taken the lead in pointing out the stark contrasts between Iran and North Korea, with various Chinese officials, including its envoys to Washington, Moscow and the UN, hammering the key point that unlike North Korea, Iran is a member of the NPT community, has renounced nuclear weapons and has been cooperating with the IAEA.

The same point has been articulated in Iran by, among others, its former chief nuclear negotiator, Hassan Rowhani, stating in a recent interview that "Iran simply wants to produce fuel for its nuclear reactors and is presently at the research and development phase. So what is all this noise about?"

Rowhani said a draft UN resolution now in circulation that proposes to ban the sale of nuclear and missile technology to Iran stems from the "anger of US and Western countries toward Iran's status and influence in the region and the world".

The draft is in response to an earlier Security Council resolution demanding that Tehran suspend uranium-enrichment activities by August 31. The council was to meet on Friday in New York to finalize a resolution.

According to Rowhani, the purpose of an "Iran sanction committee" envisaged in the draft is to "apply pressure on Iran" and to reverse the country's growing influence: "Iran's influence in Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan and among the Arab people of Persian Gulf enjoys a privileged status."

Interestingly, the joint announcements by China and Russia on the proposed sanctions coincide with a major international conference in Tehran of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which has accepted Iran as an observer. The SCO comprises China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

In his opening speech at the conference, Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki drew attention to the underlying reasons for his country's expressed interest in joining the SCO as a member, citing its shared security interests and outlooks with SCO members, such as the need for a "multipolar" world order.

Such overtures by Iran are bound to ingratiate it further to the veto-wielding powers of China and Russia, both of which have referred to their "strategic relations" with Iran playing an increasingly prominent role in the global calculus against US "hegemony".

Consequently, instead of opting for even milder, symbolic sanctions, the net effect of which may turn out to be purely negative in light of Iran's promise to curtail its cooperation with the IAEA in response to any sanctions, a more prudent course of action by the US and its European allies would be to agree to bring the Iran nuclear issue back to the IAEA. This is the appropriate forum to deal with what the IAEA's chief, Mohammad ElBaradei, has referred to as "issues of concern".

Yet such a logical and necessary move, which might prompt Iran to readopt the intrusive Additional Protocol of the NPT, is for the moment held back not only by the adamant US push for sanctions but also by lingering Russian doublespeak . This hints at a built-in ambivalence on Moscow's part, giving rise to speculation in Iran that Russia might be contemplating a bargain with the US over Iran, as it has done on a number of occasions.

Russia's doublespeak
This is a clear sign of Russian doublespeak: on Tuesday, Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov told the press, "We do not have information that would suggest that Iran is carrying out a non-peaceful [nuclear] program." This is consistent with what Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly stated, such as when he said that based on information he had received, he was convinced "Iran does not have the intention to build a nuclear bomb".

Yet on Wednesday, Ivanov told Russian television: "We don't want to have another nuclear state on our southern borders. It's obvious." Ivanov then echoed the same sentiment of some Russian parliamentarians who have openly hinted that Russia might back the draft UN resolution.

Ivanov's sudden accent on the potential nuclear threat from Iran puts him in sharp contrast with, among others, his country's foreign minister. Sergei Lavrov has repeatedly gone on record indicating the information corroborating the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program, much like Putin quoted above. Clearly, there is a policy quarrel over Iran in Kremlin's halls , and Moscow may switch to the United States' side. In that case, the pertinent issue is what will happen to Moscow's cherished "strategic partnership" with Tehran.

Strategic partnership revisited
Both Putin and his top foreign-policy advisers have repeatedly gone on record regarding the importance of Iran as Russia's "stable partner for a long time", to paraphrase Putin. As Russia's neighbor in the geo-economically important Caspian basin, Iran has been a stable market for Russia's goods, nuclear technology and conventional armament.

This is not to mention Iran's recurrent stability role in Central Asia and the Caucasus, reflected in Tehran's mediation in the recent civil war in Tajikistan and its steadfast refrain from criticizing Russia's harsh measures in Chechnya. Indeed, it was precisely in recognition of Iran's constructive role that Putin consented to Iran's observer status at the SCO.

But the whole edifice of Russia's Iran policy, ramifying the larger issues of Moscow's Middle East and Central Asia policies, is now potentially jeopardized by its doublespeak. This sends the signal that Russia might move toward the US policy of isolating Iran and ultimately dispossessing Tehran of essential nuclear know-how and technology.

Iranian President Mahmud Ahamdinejad reiterated his country's peaceful nuclear intentions in a telephone conference with Putin on Monday. And yet despite Iran's reassurances, nuclear transparency and burgeoning trade and security cooperation with Russia affecting its troubled Muslim republics, Russia is still wavering. It could commit a major strategic error by bandwagoning with the US and endorsing a revised version of the draft UN resolution that refers to the "proliferation threat" caused by Iran's nuclear program.

Is Russia bluffing, given Ivanov's admission that talk of sanctions was helpful to bring Iran back to the negotiation table? According to certain Russia experts, Moscow is merely applying a pressure tactic, and doing so partly as a result of Putin's misgivings toward the radical drift of Iranian politics. After all, Putin's Russia has declared itself in congruence with the West and despite talks of a "multipolar" world by certain Moscow strategists, there are limits to Russia's anti-Americanism, which puts Putin somewhat at odds with Tehran.

Perhaps a more substantive foreign-policy restructuring on Iran's part is required before the realistic hopes for a more meaningful Russia-Iran alliance. particularly via the SCO, can be fathomed. A careful scrutiny of Russian experts' view of Iran leaves no doubt that Moscow is averse toward Tehran's language of threats against Europe and its dismissal of the Security Council. It prefers a more soft-power Iranian approach with signs of genuine conciliation on the nuclear issue. Otherwise, there will be significant new limits on Russia's cooperation with Iran, including on the much-delayed Bushehr power plant, irrespective of their shared "containment" policies toward US power.

Bushehr: Russia's trump, or losing card?
A focus of attention now is the 1,000-megawatt light-water reactor in Bushehr, where construction of a Russian-supervised nuclear plant has been under way for 11 years. It was initially scheduled to go operational several years ago.

Moscow has lobbied hard for the exemption of this reactor from any UN sanctions barring the transfer of technology to Iran. The draft resolution, while permitting continued Iran-Russia nuclear cooperation on Bushehr, nonetheless bans the export of nuclear fuel, thus potentially rendering the reactor incapacitated when and if it is completed.

Unsurprisingly, there is a systematic attempt in the US to raise the specter of Iran "going nuclear" via the spent fuel from the Bushehr power plant, this despite the fact that in February 2005 Iran and Russia signed an agreement on the return of spent fuel to Russia. Thus, to cite an example, a recent commentary in the Wall Street Journal completely glosses over this agreement and claims that letting Iran have its sole nuclear reactor was tantamount to "giving Iran the bomb".

The Bushehr reactor may be experiencing insurmountable technical difficulties, since it began as a German enterprise before being taken over by Russia. But some voices in Iran have begun to wonder if the real reason for the constant delay is something of a tacit cooperation between Moscow and Washington.

Iran would naturally be entitled to a full refund of the US$1 billion-plus that it has expended on the project already, should the Russian contractors ultimately throw in the towel once their lame excuses are exhausted.

Already, the lengthy delay has marred the prospect of additional Russian power plants for Iran, as envisaged in a memorandum of understanding signed in Moscow in July 2002. Indeed, Russia has much to lose and little to gain from the Iranian nuclear row.

For the moment, however, with the Bushehr reactor officially some "95%" completed and slated for operation in late 2007, Moscow is tacitly using it as a trump card to bring Iran into line with the IAEA's and the UN Security Council's demands. This is evidenced by US officials such as Nicholas Burns, the under secretary of state, who explicitly asked Russia to link Bushehr's fate to Iran's response to the UN's demands.

However, this is a risky proposition that endangers Russia's relations with Iran on a long-term basis. What Moscow policymakers should concentrate on as a viable alternative is how to bring the IAEA back into the picture and save the Security Council from yet another paralyzing crisis.

This requires, in turn, that Moscow jettison its doublespeak once and for all and speak with one voice on Iran, instead of showing more and more signs of an unhealthy bipolar disorder when it comes to Iran.

Kaveh L Afrasiabi, PhD, is the author of After Khomeini: New Directions in Iran's Foreign Policy (Westview Press) and co-author of "Negotiating Iran's Nuclear Populism", Brown Journal of World Affairs, Volume XII, Issue 2, Summer 2005, with Mustafa Kibaroglu. He also wrote "Keeping Iran's nuclear potential latent", Harvard International Review, and is author of Iran's Nuclear Program: Debating Facts Versus Fiction.
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