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Alt 09-08-2006, 18:28   #38
Benjamin
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08.08.06

Straße von Hormus: Bei Blockade fehlen 20% Öl



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Iran's changing fortunes
By Neda Bolourchi
08.08.06


In the immediate aftermath of the Israeli onslaught against Lebanon - instigated by the Hezbollah kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers early last month - many blamed the Islamic Republic of Iran for the chaos. As a result of the broad US acceptance that Tehran lay behind Hezbollah's decision to seize the Israeli soldiers, neo-conservatives in the United States made new demands for a military confrontation.

However, as increasing numbers of women, children, and the elderly became casualties of the Israeli military and evidence arose that Tehran remained unaware of Hezbollah's intended actions, the Islamic Republic's political tide began turning. As a result, two dominant schools of thought regarding Iran's political prospects within the international community and on the world stage have emerged.

Iran is too dangerous
In the days immediately after Hezbollah seized the two Israeli soldiers, Tehran suffered international condemnation for its decades of support of Hezbollah. In vilifying the Islamic Republic, analysts argued that the scale and strategic repercussions of Hezbollah's operations required Tehran's pre-approval.

The basis of this theory argues that Hezbollah is not an independent group but the cat's paw. As such, some go as far as to argue that "that Iranian-backed radicals opened another front in a war that, in their minds, stretches from Gaza to Iraq". At a minimum, proponents of the theory argue that the Islamic Republic intended to use the Hezbollah kidnappings as a tool to bolster Tehran's deterrence image.

Hezbollah's actions were to serve largely as a warning to the United States and Israel, whereby both countries would cease verbal assaults and discard plans for attacking Iranian nuclear installations because the repercussions against Israel would be too great. However, Israel used the opportunity to bolster its own deterrence image and to send its own message to Tehran - Israel's military superiority is still intact, is ready to respond to any threat, and this is a sample.

Proponents argue that Israel's disproportionate response has left Hezbollah and its backers reeling. With Israel asserting its military superiority, Hezbollah and Iran's dangerous adventurism are shown to include many miscalculations and severe repercussions.

As such, Israel proves that not only are Hezbollah and Iran unwilling partners in peace negotiations, but that they are costing countries thousands of civilian lives and billions of dollars. Thus Israel's response weakens Hezbollah and its backers who lose prestige, support and financial resources by sparking the conflict and by potentially being the target of Israel's military. As a result, proponents of the theory argue, Iran is too dangerous, so no compromise, bargain or negotiation will mollify the regime.

In immediate response to Israel's destruction of Lebanon, the international community shunned and blamed Hezbollah, Iran and Syria. United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, while condemning Israel, declared that Hezbollah and its supporters had been holding Lebanon hostage for some time and reiterated his April call for a peaceful Hezbollah.

In addition, foreign dignitaries did not attempt to include Iran in negotiations. Unlike the shuttle diplomacy of Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996, where Syrian president Hafez Assad entered the international diplomatic stage and US secretary of state Warren Christopher made several visits to Damascus, Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad only seemed to be making matters worse for Tehran.

As a result, Iran and not Israel appeared to the international community as the bigger and more immediate danger to Middle Eastern stability. Thus not only did European Union representative Javier Solana not include Tehran in his early-July trips, but when Arab foreign ministers held a meeting to discuss the Lebanon crisis on July 15, the Arab ministers politely but firmly rejected Tehran's offer to attend. Buoyed by the Saudis, Egyptians and Jordanians, the Arab governments did not include the Islamic Republic in regional matters because they viewed the Hezbollah operation as a means to benefit Iran at their expense. Fears of Persian domination and the Shi'ite crescent pervaded the Arab monarchies.

Finally, the United States, Israel, Europe and the Middle East appeared aligned against Iran.

Iran cannot be ignored
On the other side of the coin, some analysts argue that because Tehran maintains open communications with Hezbollah, Iran cannot be ignored. While some of these observers argue that Hezbollah is an agent of Iran and others argue that Hezbollah serves as no one's pawn, many agree that Iran can and will serve a positive role in the Middle East, if given the chance.

Once the Israeli military bombed Qana and a UN post, Hezbollah, and with it Iran, gained the upper hand. Middle Eastern and international outrage descended on Israel and left the US, particularly a midair Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, hapless.

With Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah denying Iranian knowledge of the planned kidnappings, Tehran's stock in the international community rose further. Israel's miscalculated response to Hezbollah's miscalculations gave a virtual permission slip to pragmatists openly to declare Tehran capable and necessary to shorten the Lebanon crisis.

Simultaneously, however, many suspect that the West will have to negotiate with the Islamic Republic not only on Iran's nuclear file, but on including Tehran in summits regarding Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and Lebanon.

The end result
At this juncture, it is not possible to say whether the Islamic Republic's political standing will be hurt or not. In the early days of the war, a premature assessment concluded that Tehran would suffer. However, as the conflict changed so, too, has Iran's standing. Tehran's final standing will be determined on the outcome and the duration of the conflict. The key determining factor when the bombing stops will rest on the standing of Hezbollah within the Lebanese context and the wider region.

In preparation for the eventual ceasefire, both Israel and Hezbollah have begun their public relations campaigns. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, a career bureaucrat, must ensure that Israel is seen as having won a decisive victory over Hezbollah. In such a military victory, Israel not only sends a message to Hezbollah but also to the Palestinians, Hamas, Syria and Iran that attacks on Israel will be met with overwhelming force. Yet with its original stated intent being the destruction or dismantling of Hezbollah, Israel must also receive the mandate of any multinational force that substantively moves toward curtailing Hezbollah.

In turn, victory for Hezbollah means simply avoiding defeat. By maintaining the ability to fire short-range rockets, the greater Islamic world will perceive Hezbollah as the victors and defenders of a weak Lebanon. Despite the relatively little damage caused by such rockets, Israel's continuous statements regarding the rockets will actually bolster Hezbollah's claims of victory. Moreover, Hezbollah will remind the world that the Middle East's most powerful fighting force (Israel), supported and equipped by the world's most powerful military (the United States), bungled against a guerrilla faction that, while poorly armed, remained fastidiously resolute.

In terms of the Islamic Republic, Tehran will likely neither gain nor lose on the nuclear issue in the relative short future. As another war whose aftermath may resolve nothing, the Europeans and Iranians have already begun an attempt to open a diplomatic channel that will be necessary for the eventual political resolution of this crisis.

As the dust settles, Iran's nuclear dossier will become a front-burner issue once again. On this occurrence, European attitudes may have hardened because of the presumed perception of Tehran's irresponsibility regarding the events in the Levant. However, the extent of the European perceptions will also depend on the current diplomatic efforts of Iranian officials.

On the other side, Iran will likely be a winner in the long term on three points. First, Iran has gained politically in the broad Muslim world as the only country standing by the Muslim and Arab cause in the face of Israeli aggression. Regardless of what the regimes of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan say, the Arab street has and does support Iran's populist policies. By attacking Hezbollah, Hamas or Iran, "America's Arab allies" are merely seen as puppets of US hegemony in the Middle East. Such an issue is more and more relevant in the context of today's digital world politics.

Second, as Iran is one of very few parties that have contact with Hezbollah, the crisis conveys that Tehran can be a restraining and pragmatic power. Thus the international attention given to the Islamic Republic during the crisis demonstrates that Iran is a large power to be reckoned with and not discounted regarding regional power politics. As a result, the Lebanese crisis displays the centrality of Iran in the future political arrangements of the region.

Third, Hezbollah by virtue of its political victory will play an even more political role in Lebanon. In turn, Iran gains more leverage and influence in the regional context. In gaining more influence in Lebanon, the Islamic Republic reinforces its centrality in the Middle East's political agreements.

With the temperature rising in the Middle East, the United States finds itself in yet another difficult position that posits it as complacent in the deaths of Arab civilians and Muslims. While neo-conservatives believed the destruction of Lebanon and the death of civilians would incite the Lebanese to act against Hezbollah, Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, Speaker Nabih Berri, Saad Hariri (son of assassinated prime minister Rafik Hariri), General Michel Aoun, President Emile Lahoud and other major leaders of Lebanon have predictably rallied against Israeli actions, despite Hezbollah's initial steps.

Thus pragmatists argue that the administration of US President George W Bush may have no other option but to include Tehran in negotiations in the Lebanon crisis or be left out in the cold - a reality that has befallen US administrations since 1979.

Geändert von Benjamin (09-08-2006 um 18:35 Uhr)
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