Alt 13-02-2006, 08:58   #31
letzter welterklärer
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SPD-Politiker schwenken auf Merkel-Linie

Bei den Sozialdemokraten weicht die von Parteichef Platzeck vorgegebene Linie auf, ein militärisches Vorgehen gegen Iran auszuschließen. Man solle keine "Option vom Tisch" nehmen, sagte der Bundestagsabgeordnete Klose laut einem Zeitungsbericht - und schwenkt damit auf Unionslinie ein.


Der ideale Bürger: händefalten, köpfchensenken und immer an Frau Merkel denken
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Alt 26-02-2006, 17:46   #32
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26. Februar 2006,00.html
Es grüßt euch

Sei immer ehrlich zu deinem Nächsten, auch wenn er es nicht gerne hört

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Alt 17-03-2006, 08:55   #33
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USA bekräftigen Recht auf Präventivschläge

Der Iran stellt für die USA die größte Bedrohung ihrer Sicherheit dar. Präsident George W. Bush setzt jedoch weiter auf Verhandlungen mit dem Regime unter Mahmud Ahmadinedschad. Überraschend reagierte Teheran mit dem ersten direkten Gesprächangebot nach 27 Jahren.

Schöne Grüße
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Alt 27-03-2006, 13:01   #34
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Netzwerk für iranisches Atomprogramm aufgedeckt

ARD-Magazin: Netzwerk für iranisches Atomprogramm aufgedeckt

Montag 27. März 2006, 09:15 Uhr


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Alt 31-03-2006, 20:31   #35
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Iran droht mit neuer Geheimwaffe

Der Iran kümmert sich wenig um die Warnungen des UN-Sicherheitsrats: Vielmehr setzt Teheran weiter auf Konfrontation. Die Revolutionären Garden verkündeten heute, sie seien im Besitz einer neuen gefährlichen Waffe. Diese sei bereits erfolgreich getestet worden.

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Alt 11-04-2006, 13:32   #36
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Siehe diesen Artikel im "The New Yorker", der jetzt jede Menge Staub aufwirbelt:

Der Artikel ist eine fortsetzung eines Berichts vom gleichen Autor, vor ca. 1 Jahr; im gleichen Thread darüber.
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Alt 09-08-2006, 18:24   #37
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Clearing the path for US war on Iran
By Gareth Porter

WASHINGTON - Israel has argued that the war against Hezbollah's rocket arsenal was a defensive response to the Shi'ite organization's threat to Israeli security, but the evidence points to a much more ambitious objective - the weakening of Iran's deterrent to an attack on its nuclear sites.

In planning for the destruction of most of Hezbollah's arsenal and prevention of any resupply from Iran, Israel appears to have hoped to eliminate a major reason the US administration had shelved the military option for dealing with Iran's nuclear program - the fear that Israel would suffer massive casualties from Hezbollah's rockets in retaliation for an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities.

One leading expert on Israeli national-defense policy issues believes the aim of the Israeli campaign against Hezbollah was to change the US administration's mind about attacking Iran. Edward Luttwak, senior adviser to the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, says administration officials have privately dismissed the option of air strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities in the past, citing estimates that a Hezbollah rocket attack in retaliation would kill thousands of people in northern Israel.

But Israeli officials saw a war in Lebanon to destroy Hezbollah's arsenal and prevent further resupply in the future as a way to eliminate that objection to the military option, says Luttwak.

The risk to Israel of launching such an offensive was that it would unleash the very rain of Hezbollah rockets on Israel that it sought to avert. But Luttwak believes the Israelis calculated that they could degrade Hezbollah's rocket forces without too many casualties by striking preemptively.

"They knew that a carefully prepared and coordinated rocket attack by Hezbollah would be much more catastrophic than one carried out under attack by Israel," he said.

Gerald M Steinberg, an Israeli specialist on security affairs at Bar Ilon University who reflects Israeli government thinking, did not allude to the link between destruction of Hezbollah's rocket arsenal and a possible attack on Iran in an interview with Bernard Gwertzman of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York last week. But he did say there is "some expectation" in Israel that after the US congressional elections, President George W Bush "will decide that he has to do what he has to do".

Steinberg said Israel wanted to "get an assessment" of whether the United States would "present a military attack against the Iranian nuclear sites as the only option". If not, he suggested that Israel was still considering its own options.

Specialists on Iran and Hezbollah have long believed that the missiles Iran has supplied to Hezbollah were explicitly intended to deter an Israeli attack on Iran. Ephraim Kam, a specialist on Iran at Israel's Jaffe Center for Strategic Studies, wrote in December 2004 that Hezbollah's threat against northern Israel was a key element of Iran's deterrent to a US attack.

Ali Ansari, an associate professor at the University of St Andrews in Scotland and author of a new book on the US confrontation with Iran, was quoted in the Toronto Star on July 30 as saying, "Hezbollah was always Iran's deterrent force against Israel."

Iran has also threatened direct retaliation against Israel with the Shahab-3 missile from Iranian territory. However, Iran may be concerned about the possibility that Israel's Arrow system could intercept most of them, as the Jaffe Center's Kam observed in 2004. That elevates the importance to Iran of Hezbollah's ability to threaten retaliation.

Hezbollah received some Soviet-era Katyusha rockets, with a range of 8 kilometers, and hundreds of longer-range missiles, after Israel withdrew from southern Lebanon in 2000. But the Israeli daily Ha'aretz, citing a report by Israeli military intelligence at the time, has reported that the number of missiles and rockets in Hezbollah hands grew to more 12,000 in 2004.

That was when Iranian officials felt that the Bush administration might seriously consider an attack on their nuclear sites, because it knew Iran was poised to begin enrichment of uranium. It was also when Iranian officials began to imply that Hezbollah could retaliate against any attack on Iran, although they have never stated that explicitly.

The first hint of Iranian concern about the possible strategic implications of the Israeli campaign to degrade the Hezbollah missile force in south Lebanon came in a report by Michael Slackman in the New York Times on July 25. Slackman quoted an Iranian official with "close ties to the highest levels of government" as saying, "They want to cut off one of Iran's arms."

The same story quoted Mohsen Rezai, the former head of Iran's Revolutionary Guards, as saying, "Israel and the US knew that as long as Hamas and Hezbollah were there, confronting Iran would be costly" - an obvious reference to the deterrent value of the missiles in Lebanon. "So, to deal with Iran, they first want to eliminate forces close to Iran that are in Lebanon and Palestine."

Israel has been planning its campaign against Hezbollah's missile arsenal for many months. Matthew Kalman reported from Tel Aviv in the San Francisco Chronicle on July 21, "More than a year ago, a senior Israeli army officer began giving PowerPoint presentations, on an off-the-record basis, to US and other diplomats, journalists and think tanks, setting out the plan for the current operation in revealing detail."

Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's main purpose in meeting with Bush on May 25 was clearly to push the United States to agree to use force, if necessary, to stop Iran's uranium-enrichment program. Four days before the meeting, Olmert told CNN that Iran's "technological threshold" was "very close". In response to a question about US and European diplomacy on the issue, Olmert replied, "I prefer to take the necessary measures to stop it, rather than find out later that my indifference was so dangerous."

At his meeting with Bush, according to Yitzhak Benhorin of Israel's ynetnews, Olmert pressed Bush on Israel's intelligence assessment that Iran would gain the technology necessary to build a bomb within a year and expressed fears that diplomatic efforts were not going to work.

It seems likely that Olmert discussed Israel's plans for degrading Hezbollah's missile capabilities as a way of dramatically reducing the risks involved in an air campaign against Iran's nuclear sites, and that Bush gave his approval. That would account for Olmert's comment to Israeli reporters after the meeting, reported by ynetnews but not by US news media: "I am very, very, very satisfied."

Bush's refusal to do anything to curb Israel's freedom to cause havoc on Lebanon further suggests that he encouraged the Israelis to take advantage of any pretext to launch the offensive. The Israeli plan may have given US Vice President Dick Cheney and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld new ammunition for advocating a strike on Iran's nuclear sites.

Rumsfeld was the voice of administration policy toward Iran from 2002 to 2004, and he often appeared to be laying the political groundwork for an eventual military attack on Iran. But he has been silenced on the subject of Iran since Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice took over Iran policy in January 2005.

Gareth Porter is a historian and national-security policy analyst. His latest book, Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam, was published in June 2005.

(Inter Press Service)
Separate Recherche ergab:

Nach dem 7. November 2006 hat Bush voraussichtlich freie Bahn:

Elections for the United States House of Representatives will be held on November 7, 2006 , with all of the 435 seats in the House up for election. Since Representatives are elected for two-year terms, those elected will serve in the 110th United States Congress from January 3, 2007 until January 3, 2009.

Elections for the United States Senate will also be held on November 7, 2006 , with 33 of the 100 seats in the United States Senate being contested. Senators are elected for six-year terms, and the term of office for those elected in 2006 will be from January 3, 2007 until January 3, 2013. Those Senators who were elected in 2000 (known as "Class 1") will be seeking reelection or retiring in 2006.

The United States House of Representatives is, along with the United States Senate, one of the two houses of the Congress of the United States.

The 2006 congressional election is scheduled for the same date as many state and local elections, including those for 36 state governors.

Geändert von Benjamin (09-08-2006 um 19:40 Uhr)
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Alt 09-08-2006, 18:28   #38
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Leiter des französischen Öl-Instituts: "Bei Iran-Krise Ölpreis bis 250 Dollar möglich!"

Straße von Hormus: Bei Blockade fehlen 20% Öl


Iran's changing fortunes
By Neda Bolourchi

In the immediate aftermath of the Israeli onslaught against Lebanon - instigated by the Hezbollah kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers early last month - many blamed the Islamic Republic of Iran for the chaos. As a result of the broad US acceptance that Tehran lay behind Hezbollah's decision to seize the Israeli soldiers, neo-conservatives in the United States made new demands for a military confrontation.

However, as increasing numbers of women, children, and the elderly became casualties of the Israeli military and evidence arose that Tehran remained unaware of Hezbollah's intended actions, the Islamic Republic's political tide began turning. As a result, two dominant schools of thought regarding Iran's political prospects within the international community and on the world stage have emerged.

Iran is too dangerous
In the days immediately after Hezbollah seized the two Israeli soldiers, Tehran suffered international condemnation for its decades of support of Hezbollah. In vilifying the Islamic Republic, analysts argued that the scale and strategic repercussions of Hezbollah's operations required Tehran's pre-approval.

The basis of this theory argues that Hezbollah is not an independent group but the cat's paw. As such, some go as far as to argue that "that Iranian-backed radicals opened another front in a war that, in their minds, stretches from Gaza to Iraq". At a minimum, proponents of the theory argue that the Islamic Republic intended to use the Hezbollah kidnappings as a tool to bolster Tehran's deterrence image.

Hezbollah's actions were to serve largely as a warning to the United States and Israel, whereby both countries would cease verbal assaults and discard plans for attacking Iranian nuclear installations because the repercussions against Israel would be too great. However, Israel used the opportunity to bolster its own deterrence image and to send its own message to Tehran - Israel's military superiority is still intact, is ready to respond to any threat, and this is a sample.

Proponents argue that Israel's disproportionate response has left Hezbollah and its backers reeling. With Israel asserting its military superiority, Hezbollah and Iran's dangerous adventurism are shown to include many miscalculations and severe repercussions.

As such, Israel proves that not only are Hezbollah and Iran unwilling partners in peace negotiations, but that they are costing countries thousands of civilian lives and billions of dollars. Thus Israel's response weakens Hezbollah and its backers who lose prestige, support and financial resources by sparking the conflict and by potentially being the target of Israel's military. As a result, proponents of the theory argue, Iran is too dangerous, so no compromise, bargain or negotiation will mollify the regime.

In immediate response to Israel's destruction of Lebanon, the international community shunned and blamed Hezbollah, Iran and Syria. United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan, while condemning Israel, declared that Hezbollah and its supporters had been holding Lebanon hostage for some time and reiterated his April call for a peaceful Hezbollah.

In addition, foreign dignitaries did not attempt to include Iran in negotiations. Unlike the shuttle diplomacy of Operation Grapes of Wrath in 1996, where Syrian president Hafez Assad entered the international diplomatic stage and US secretary of state Warren Christopher made several visits to Damascus, Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad only seemed to be making matters worse for Tehran.

As a result, Iran and not Israel appeared to the international community as the bigger and more immediate danger to Middle Eastern stability. Thus not only did European Union representative Javier Solana not include Tehran in his early-July trips, but when Arab foreign ministers held a meeting to discuss the Lebanon crisis on July 15, the Arab ministers politely but firmly rejected Tehran's offer to attend. Buoyed by the Saudis, Egyptians and Jordanians, the Arab governments did not include the Islamic Republic in regional matters because they viewed the Hezbollah operation as a means to benefit Iran at their expense. Fears of Persian domination and the Shi'ite crescent pervaded the Arab monarchies.

Finally, the United States, Israel, Europe and the Middle East appeared aligned against Iran.

Iran cannot be ignored
On the other side of the coin, some analysts argue that because Tehran maintains open communications with Hezbollah, Iran cannot be ignored. While some of these observers argue that Hezbollah is an agent of Iran and others argue that Hezbollah serves as no one's pawn, many agree that Iran can and will serve a positive role in the Middle East, if given the chance.

Once the Israeli military bombed Qana and a UN post, Hezbollah, and with it Iran, gained the upper hand. Middle Eastern and international outrage descended on Israel and left the US, particularly a midair Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, hapless.

With Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah denying Iranian knowledge of the planned kidnappings, Tehran's stock in the international community rose further. Israel's miscalculated response to Hezbollah's miscalculations gave a virtual permission slip to pragmatists openly to declare Tehran capable and necessary to shorten the Lebanon crisis.

Simultaneously, however, many suspect that the West will have to negotiate with the Islamic Republic not only on Iran's nuclear file, but on including Tehran in summits regarding Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine and Lebanon.

The end result
At this juncture, it is not possible to say whether the Islamic Republic's political standing will be hurt or not. In the early days of the war, a premature assessment concluded that Tehran would suffer. However, as the conflict changed so, too, has Iran's standing. Tehran's final standing will be determined on the outcome and the duration of the conflict. The key determining factor when the bombing stops will rest on the standing of Hezbollah within the Lebanese context and the wider region.

In preparation for the eventual ceasefire, both Israel and Hezbollah have begun their public relations campaigns. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, a career bureaucrat, must ensure that Israel is seen as having won a decisive victory over Hezbollah. In such a military victory, Israel not only sends a message to Hezbollah but also to the Palestinians, Hamas, Syria and Iran that attacks on Israel will be met with overwhelming force. Yet with its original stated intent being the destruction or dismantling of Hezbollah, Israel must also receive the mandate of any multinational force that substantively moves toward curtailing Hezbollah.

In turn, victory for Hezbollah means simply avoiding defeat. By maintaining the ability to fire short-range rockets, the greater Islamic world will perceive Hezbollah as the victors and defenders of a weak Lebanon. Despite the relatively little damage caused by such rockets, Israel's continuous statements regarding the rockets will actually bolster Hezbollah's claims of victory. Moreover, Hezbollah will remind the world that the Middle East's most powerful fighting force (Israel), supported and equipped by the world's most powerful military (the United States), bungled against a guerrilla faction that, while poorly armed, remained fastidiously resolute.

In terms of the Islamic Republic, Tehran will likely neither gain nor lose on the nuclear issue in the relative short future. As another war whose aftermath may resolve nothing, the Europeans and Iranians have already begun an attempt to open a diplomatic channel that will be necessary for the eventual political resolution of this crisis.

As the dust settles, Iran's nuclear dossier will become a front-burner issue once again. On this occurrence, European attitudes may have hardened because of the presumed perception of Tehran's irresponsibility regarding the events in the Levant. However, the extent of the European perceptions will also depend on the current diplomatic efforts of Iranian officials.

On the other side, Iran will likely be a winner in the long term on three points. First, Iran has gained politically in the broad Muslim world as the only country standing by the Muslim and Arab cause in the face of Israeli aggression. Regardless of what the regimes of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan say, the Arab street has and does support Iran's populist policies. By attacking Hezbollah, Hamas or Iran, "America's Arab allies" are merely seen as puppets of US hegemony in the Middle East. Such an issue is more and more relevant in the context of today's digital world politics.

Second, as Iran is one of very few parties that have contact with Hezbollah, the crisis conveys that Tehran can be a restraining and pragmatic power. Thus the international attention given to the Islamic Republic during the crisis demonstrates that Iran is a large power to be reckoned with and not discounted regarding regional power politics. As a result, the Lebanese crisis displays the centrality of Iran in the future political arrangements of the region.

Third, Hezbollah by virtue of its political victory will play an even more political role in Lebanon. In turn, Iran gains more leverage and influence in the regional context. In gaining more influence in Lebanon, the Islamic Republic reinforces its centrality in the Middle East's political agreements.

With the temperature rising in the Middle East, the United States finds itself in yet another difficult position that posits it as complacent in the deaths of Arab civilians and Muslims. While neo-conservatives believed the destruction of Lebanon and the death of civilians would incite the Lebanese to act against Hezbollah, Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora, Speaker Nabih Berri, Saad Hariri (son of assassinated prime minister Rafik Hariri), General Michel Aoun, President Emile Lahoud and other major leaders of Lebanon have predictably rallied against Israeli actions, despite Hezbollah's initial steps.

Thus pragmatists argue that the administration of US President George W Bush may have no other option but to include Tehran in negotiations in the Lebanon crisis or be left out in the cold - a reality that has befallen US administrations since 1979.

Geändert von Benjamin (09-08-2006 um 18:35 Uhr)
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Alt 16-08-2006, 09:55   #39
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Eine Zukunftsprognose für die Region im Nahen Osten, den anstehenden Angriff der USA auf den Iran in 2007 und die Börsen - zudem eine historische Parallele, dies alles hier:
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Alt 20-08-2006, 21:07   #40
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Also, hier mal ein anderer Aspekt - Die Rolle der Vereinten Nationen, also der UN.

Meine These lautet: Die UN ist im ganzen Nahen Osten auf dem Wege des Scheiterns und wird dort als machtvoll handelnde Institution in 2007 von den USA abgelöst werden.

Die Schwäche der UN zeigte sich bereits in dem ewig langen Schweigen nach Beginn der Angriffe im Libanon. Wochenlang flogen israelische Bomber Angriffe, bis sich die Leute in der UN endlich auf eine Resolution einigen konnten. Das hat Vertrauen gekostet und muss als Indiz dafür gewertet werden, dass das Gewicht der UN in der internationalen Politik erheblich abgenommen hat.

Die Schwäche der UN wird sich nun fortsetzen bei dem Versuch, ihrer eigene UN-Resolution nun auch mit UN-Bodentruppen ("Blauhelmen") Zähne zu verleihen. Diese Aktion wird nämlich fehlschlagen! Daran habe ich keine Zweifel mehr.

Der Grund:

Es gibt nicht wirklich den festen Willen aller Beteiligten zur Erreichung des Zieles. Die Beteiligten entsenden Truppen, weil sie schlecht Nein sagen können, nicht, weil sie wirklich (also belastbar) hinter dem Truppenauftrag stehen. Jede Regierung wünscht sich, dass der Krug (hinsichtlich Menschenleben, finanzieller Kosten und beschädigte Geschäftsverbindungen mit arabischen Geschäftspartnern) an ihr möglichst vorbeigeht, dass die eigenen Soldaten nicht leiden müssen, und dass die anderen Länder doch bitte schön die Arbeit machen.

Die nahe liegenen Folgen:

Das Mandat dürfte kollabieren, sobald es ernst wird. Dann wird der öffentliche Druck wachsen und jede Regierung wird über kurz oder lang nur noch die eigenen Leute rausholen wollen.

Die Komandostruktur der "Blauhelme" dürfte sehr schwach sein. Um so ein Sammelsurium von Truppen aus verschiedensten Staaten mit unterschiedlichen Sprachen, Schriften, Umgangsformen und Traditionen zu organisieren und zu führen bräuchte es eine sehr lange Vorbereitungszeit und gemeinsame Übungen. Das alles gibt es hier nicht. Da wird improvisiert werden müssen und sehr arbeitsteilig vorgegangen werden. Die Truppe wird kaum wissen, wieviele Hände sie hat, geschweige denn, was die jeweils gerade machen. Das ist hoffnungslos.

Diese UN-Aktion wird also absehbar scheitern.

Die ferner liegenden Folgen:

Wenn die UN scheitert, blickt man auf die USA, um die Situation voranzubringen. Die USA werden förmlich von den westlichen Staaten gerufen werden.

Die USA wird also als der einzige Staat antreten, der Willens und in der Lage ist, hier direkt einzugreifen und Veränderungen auch durchzusetzen. Und alle übrigen westlichen Staaten werden das anerkennen. Das bedeutet, dass der Bock zum Gärtner gemacht wird! Die Bush-Regierung will seit langem im Nahen Osten eine neue Ordnung. Sie werden die Hisbollah in einem Atemzug mit dem Iran nennen: Frieden kommt dann und nur dann, wenn im Namen von Terrorismusbekämpfung und Frieden der Iran von den USA angegriffen werden wird. Und da wird keine UN dagegen angehen (können und wollen). Klar, die Diplomaten werden sich laufend treffen und belanglose Warnungen, Mahnungen und sonstige Sprechblasen in die Mikrophone abgeben, aber sie werden nichts zustande bringen. Alle übrigen Staaten werden sich zurückhalten, graue Maus spielen wollen, jede kleinste Äußerung wird mit zig anderen Staaten erst abgesprochen werden, bevor man sie ausspricht.

Erst lange nach den Bombenangriffen der USA auf Iran, nachdem alles vorbei sein wird, wird die UN geflissentlich irgendwelche Hilfsprogramme starten wollen, für die dann auch wieder kein Land Geld gibt.

Es ist ein Trauerspiel!

Der Gang der Dinge geht dahin, dass die USA die Weltpolitik wie eine Hegemonialmacht bestimmen und den Iran vermutlich etwa April/Mai 2007 angreifen werden. Und obwohl praktisch kaum ein anderer Staat das will, wird nichts wirkungsvolles geschehen, um das zu verhindern:
- Die westlichen Länder werden die Supermacht USA als Verbündete nicht ersthaft bedrängen wollen.
- Die Länder mit islamischer Bevölkerungsmehrheit sind in so viele Untergruppen zergliedert, die untereinander beträchtliche Differenzen austragen, dass von dort eine effiziente gemeinsame Strategie - und deren Umsetzung - vollständig undenkbar ist - trotz all der Ölmilliarden. Beispiel: Saudi Arabien als Unterstützer der Sunniten hat sich gerade erst für 15 Milliarden Euro etliche Kampfjets mit Bewaffnung und Wartungsservice gekauft. Gegen wen sollen die wohl kämpfen? Ich tippe auf ein saudisches Schutzbedürfnis gegenüber dem Iran, der bekanntlich die Schiiten stützt. Diese beiden Gruppen haben im Irak seit längerem bereits Bombenanschläge gegeneinander durchgeführt. Also: Hoffnungslos, aus dem arabischen Lager irgendeine effektive Intervention im Nahost-Konflikt zu erwarten.

Es bleibt wirklich nur die USA übrig, um wirkungsvoll (besser: machtvoll) zu handeln. Und wenn die typische Geschichte (von Aufstieg und Niedergang von Hegemonialmächten) sich als Grundmuster auch hier wiederholt, dann werden die USA tatsächlich diesen Krieg gegen den Iran führen und gewinnen. Die Rohstoffquellen im Nahen Osten (Öl und Gas) sollen und werden über das übliche privatkapitalistische System mittels Angebot und Nachfrage zu niedrigen Preisen ihre Rohstoffe reichlich auf den Markt werfen. Ich bin der Überzeugung, dass dies das tatsächliche Kriegsziel der USA sein wird. Diese ganze Terrorbekämpfung ist zwar einerseits real, weil es die Anschläge ja wirklich gibt, aber sie ist zum größeren Anteil imaginär, weil die Terrorbedrohung mit guter normaler geheimdienstlicher und polizeilicher Arbeit ausreichend eingedämmt werden könnte, wie man anderen Verbrechen ja auch entgegentritt. Die Schäden z. B. durch Wirtschaftsbetrug oder Alkohol am Steuer dürften volkswirtschaftlich ein mehrfaches (!) ausmachen gegenüber dem, was da durch irgendwelche Terroranschläge je im Westen zu Schaden kam. Wir haben größere Probleme auf ganz "banalen" Schauplätzen.

Diese unlogische Unverhältnismäßigkeit sowohl bei den Israelis im Libanon als auch vor allem bei den USA hinsichtlich der Terrorbedrohung deutet doch sehr deutlich an, dass es darum gar nicht geht. Es geht tatsächlich um die Beseitigung der islamistischen Dominanz auf die Entscheidungen von Regierenden und Geschäftspartnern, um eine Trennung von Islam und Geschäft, um die Einführung üblicher privatkapitalischer Regelwerke im Nahen Osten, vor allem im Iran und Irak als bedeutende Rohstoffquellen.

Das will die USA - und das wollen, wenn sie ehrlich sind, auch alle übrigen westlichen Staaten. Und daher leisten sie all dieser verrrückten Unverhältnismäßgkeit gegenüber keinen Widerstand. Sie wollen einfach als Trittbrettfahrer später den Nutzen hinsichtlich der Rohstoffquellen mit nutzen, ohne vorher viel Aufwand dafür getrieben zu haben. Sie schieben die Verantwortung ab, weil sie riskant und mühsam ist. Sie werden also den Teufel tun und gerade eben nicht ihren Kopf all zu weit aus dem Fenster lehnen wollen. Sollen die USA es doch richten....
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Alt 27-08-2006, 16:28   #41
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In Israel empfinde ich derzeit diese beiden Meldungen als sehr erstaunlich, die in einem FAZ-Artikel vom 26.08. zu lesen sind:

1. 110 Tage nach Amtsantritt hat die israelische Bevölkerung ihr Vertrauen in die gesamte Führungselite verloren (Ergebnis einer repräsentativen Umfrage einer israelischen Zeitung). Und das, obwohl sich das Land gerade in einem Ausnahmezustand befindet, was normalerweise bewirkt, dass sich die Bevölkerung um die existierende Regierung schart.

2. Nach Berichten einer israelischen Zeitung glaubt die israelische Führung nicht, dass die internationale Gemeinschaft den Iran hinsichtlich seiner atomaren Ambitionen wird stoppen können. Deshalb würden Entscheidungen im Hinblick auf einen Einsatz militärischer Gewalt gegen iranische Nukleareinrichtungen näher rücken. Der Generalstabschef der Israelis beauftragte den Oberkommandierenden der israelischen Luftwaffe damit, Einsatzpläne für einen möglichen Krieg mit dem Iran auszuarbeiten. Jener soll die Aktivitäten des israelischen Geheimdienstes und der einzelnen Truppenteile koordinieren. Kommt es zum Krieg, wird er der Oberbefehlshaber der ganzen israelischen Truppen. Seine Funktion wird derzeit betitelt mit "Oberkommandierender für nicht an Israel grenzende Länder".

Was ich schon die ganze Zeit befürchtete verdichtet sich mehr und mehr.

Mehrheit für Olmerts Rücktritt
25. August 2006

Geändert von Benjamin (27-08-2006 um 16:34 Uhr)
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Alt 27-08-2006, 16:41   #42
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Iranische Maximalposition
25. August 2006

Von Nikolas Busse

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Alt 27-08-2006, 16:58   #43
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Unstrittig ist aber auch, daß in einem ersten Schritt nur Sanktionen verhängt werden sollen, die das Leben der iranischen Zivilbevölkerung nicht beeinträchtigen. In Washington ist etwa von Reisebeschränkungen für Mitglieder der iranischen Führung sowie von der Sperrung von deren Auslandskonten die Rede. Da es seit dem Abbruch der diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen Teheran und Washington vom April 1980 ein in Schritten verschärftes amerikanisches Wirtschaftsembargo gegen Iran gibt, können die Vereinigten Staaten von sich aus keinen Sanktionshebel mehr ansetzen. Deshalb wäre die Einbindung der Staatengemeinschaft und zumal der Widersacher Rußland und China in ein Sanktionsregime ein wichtiger politischer Erfolg für Washington. (Auszug aus einem FAZ-Artikel)

Das bedeutet, dass die UN nach Wunsch Washingtons jetzt zügig im September diese harmlosen Sanktionen verhängen soll. Die Eieruhr von deren Einwirkzeit auf den Iran läuft dann bis kurz nach den US-Kongresswahlen (Fristsetzung z. B. 10.November 06).

Dann wird erneut festgestellt werden, dass der Iran nicht will. Damit ist der Weg frei für die USA und Israel, den Iran militärisch anzugreifen, etwa April/Mai 2007.

Der Angriff Libanons ist das Pilotprojekt eines Angriffskrieges, gegen den die UN wirklich nichts wirkungsvolles zustande bringt. Das war ein voller Erfolg für Israel/USA: Die Region im Libanon wurde um Jahrzehnte zurückgebombt, die Leute dort haben jetzt erst einmal andere Probleme.
Nach dieser positiven Erfahrung werden Israel/USA die nächste Stufe wagen können: Den Angriff auf den Iran mit dem Ziel, durch ein fürchterliches Luftbombardement die gesamte Infrastruktur des Irans (also auch rein zivile Einrichtungen) vollständig zu vernichten. Die Zielsetzung wird Vernichtung lauten, nicht Besiegung. Bodentruppen kommen nicht in Frage, also muss das Ausmass der Zerstörung 100%-ig sein. Keine wichtige Straße wird mehr benutzbar sein. Alle Kraftwerke zerstört. Alle Wasserversorgung vernichtet. Alle Moscheen vernichtet, jedenfalls schwer beschädigt. Es geht den USA um Vernichtung! Wer in den Schutthalden um sein Überleben kämpfen muss, der hat wenig Sinn für politisch-strategische Appelle von Mullahs.

Natürlich macht das die US-Regierung nur - um die armen Iraner zu befreien! Wenn die US-amerikanische und israelische Luftwaffe fertig sein werden mit dem befreien wird man viele 100000 Tote zählen müssen.

Otto Normalverbraucher wird bei den Fernsehbildern ein bedauerliches "Tja!" ausstoßen und sich dann bald an der Tankstelle über billigeres Benzin freuen. "Dann es ja wenigstens ein gutes gehabt!" - wird er sich dann evtl. denken...

Geändert von Benjamin (27-08-2006 um 17:12 Uhr)
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Alt 27-08-2006, 17:49   #44
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Hier vermutlich der einzig wirksame Einflussfaktor, der einen Angriffskrieg stoppen könnte: Geldmangel auf Seiten der Angreifer. Anders ausgedrückt: Die großen Kapitaleigner lassen ihren Einfluss spielen, wenn sie meinen, sie könnten während ihrer mutmaßlichen Amtszeit im gegenwärtigen Job durch zu hohe Gesamtkosten eines Angriffskrieges persönlich mehr finanziellen Schaden erleiden als Profit für sich persönlich anhäufen durch die indirekten Benefits, die von billigem Öl und Gas ausgehen.

Hier ein Artikel der israelischen Zeitung Haaretz, der die erheblichen Kosten für Israel verdeutlicht:

'Defense demands could set standard of living back 20 years'
Sun., August 27, 2006

By Moti Bassok

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Defense Minister Amir Peretz and Finance Minister Abraham Hirchson are to meet this morning to discuss defense establishment budgetary demands through 2010.

Defense officials are seeking NIS 30 billion, mostly in fiscal 2007 and 2008, for resupplying, reacquiring weapons systems damaged during the war and preparing for the next war based on the lessons of recent hostilities, including developing new arms. The defense establishment is working under the assumption the Israel Defense Forces needs to be prepared quickly.

However, according to a senior defense establishment official, cabinet compliance to the demand would subjugate the entire civilian establishment to military demands and constitute a mortal blow to civil budgets, including infrastructure and education.

"If the Defense Ministry demand for an additional NIS 30 billion in 2007 to 2010 is accepted, Israel will return to the 'Lost Decade' [1974-85 after the Yom Kippur War, when defense budgets dwarfed civil budgets and inflation was in triple digits]," the official said yesterday.

The government economist claims the demands are extravagant and would push Israel 20 to 30 years back economically, including a sharp drop in the standard of living.

The economist added that the defense establishment is already slated to receive NIS 2 billion additional funds - beyond the NIS 46 billion budgeted for 2006 and each year for the next several - but this is along way from the exaggerated demands presented in recent days.

He noted defense spending has not been cut back in recent years, in fact has increased several times beyond the approved budget through funding transfers for specific matters, such as during the second Palestinian intifada, construction of the separation fence and during disengagement from the Gaza Strip, all evident in a report by state comptroller Eliezer Goldberg.

The economist believes it is time for a civilian review of the tremendous defense spending in recent years, calling it inconceivable that with such large budgets, soldiers and reservists serving in Lebanon faced shortages of equipment, supplies, food and beverages.

The Prime Minister's Office and treasury believe the defense establishment is under pressure in light of the repeated allegations in the media about its functioning during the war.

Convincing the rebels

Hirchson and Peretz will meet this afternoon with the Labor party rebels - MKs Avishay Braverman, Shelly Yachimovich and Orit Noked. Hirchson and Peretz hope to convince the three Finance Committee members to support a NIS 2 billion cut in the 2006 budget, scheduled for a vote tomorrow.

Hirchson will explain to the lawmakers that the cabinet decision to transfer NIS 2 billion from other items to the defense budget is critical for financing the war in Lebanon. He will also point out that Labor cabinet ministers supported this decision. Hirchson will reject charges that the NIS 2 billion cut will harm the underprivileged, noting that none of the money will come from social welfare ministries.

The Finance Ministry budgets division will also be represented.

It is likely that if the three refuse to vote in favor of the cabinet proposal in tomorrow morning's committee vote, they will be replaced by MKs considered loyal.
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Alt 29-08-2006, 18:08   #45
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US made an offer Iran can only refuse
By Gareth Porter
Aug 24, 2006

WASHINGTON - Even before Iran gave its formal counter-offer to the permanent-five-plus-one countries (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China plus Germany) on Tuesday, the administration of US George W Bush had already begun the process of organizing sanctions against Iran.

Washington had already held a conference call on sanctions on Sunday with French, German and British officials, the Washington Post reported.

In Tehran on Tuesday, Iran's top nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, delivered the official response to an international package to curb Tehran's nuclear program and suggested that Iran was prepared for "serious talks" with the six countries that extended the offer.

Details of Iran's 23-page written response have not been released, but they crucially are expected to confirm that Iran is not prepared to suspend uranium-enrichment activities without comprehensive security guarantees, especially from the US, in return.

The US has never been prepared to give such guarantees, and thus ends what appeared on the surface to be a genuine multilateral initiative for negotiations with Iran on the terms under which it would give up its nuclear program.

US Ambassador to the United Nations John Bolton was reported to have said that his country would study the Iranian response "carefully", adding that "if it doesn't meet with the terms set by the Security Council, we will proceed to economic sanctions".

The history of the international proposal shows that the Bush administration was determined from the beginning that it would fail, so that it could bring to a halt a multilateral diplomacy on Iran's nuclear program that the hardliners in the administration had always found a hindrance to their policy.

Britain, France and Germany (European Union Three - EU-3), which had begun negotiations with Tehran on the nuclear issue in October 2003, had concluded very early that Iran's security concerns would have to be central to any agreement. It has been generally forgotten that the November 14, 2004, Paris Agreement between the EU and Iran included an assurance by the EU-3 that the "long-term agreement" they pledged to reach would "provide ... firm commitments on security issues".

The EU-3 had tried in vain to get the Bush administration to support their diplomatic efforts with Tehran by authorizing the inclusion of security guarantees in a proposal they were working on last summer. In a joint press conference with US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in July 2005, French Foreign Minister Philippe Douste-Blazy referred to the need to "make sure ... that we discuss with [the Iranians] the security of their country. And for this, we shall need the United States ..."

The EU-3 and the Bush administration agreed that the permanent-five-plus-one proposal would demand that Iran make three concessions to avoid UN Security Council sanctions and to begin negotiations on an agreement with positive incentives: the indefinite suspension of its enrichment program, agreement to resolve all the outstanding concerns of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and resumption of full implementation of the Additional Protocol under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which calls for very tight monitoring of all suspected nuclear sites by the IAEA.

That meant that Tehran would have had to give up its major bargaining chips before the negotiations even began. The Europeans wanted security guarantees from Washington to be part of the deal. Douste-Blazy said on May 8 that if Iran cooperated, it could be rewarded with what he called an "ambitious package" in several economic domains as well as in "the security domain".

The EU-3 draft proposal, which was leaked to ABC (American Broadcasting Co) News and posted on its website, included a formula that fell short of an explicit guarantee. However, it did offer "support for an inter-governmental forum, including countries of the region and other interested countries, to promote dialogue and cooperation on security issues in the Persian Gulf, with the aim of establishing regional security arrangements and a cooperative relationship on regional security arrangements including guarantees for territorial integrity and political sovereignty".

That convoluted language suggested there was a way for Iran's security to be guaranteed by the United States. But the problem was that it was still subject to a US veto. In any case, as Steven R Weisman of the New York Times reported on May 19, the Bush administration rejected any reference to a regional security framework in which Iran could participate.

Rice denied on Fox News on May 21 that the US was being "asked about security guarantees", but that was deliberately misleading. As a European diplomat explained to Reuters on May 20, the only reason the Europeans had not used the term "security guarantees" in their draft was that "Washington is against giving Iran assurances that it will not be attacked".

In light of these news reports, the public comment by Iran's UN Ambassador Javad Zarif on May 27 is particularly revealing. Zarif declared that the incentive package "needs to deal with issues that are fundamental to the resolution" of the problem. "The solution has to take into consideration Iranian concerns."

Zarif seems to have been saying that Iran wanted to get something of comparable importance for giving up its bargaining chips in advance and discussing the renunciation of enrichment altogether. That statement, which departed from Iran's usual emphasis on its right to nuclear technology under the NPT, suggested that Tehran was at least open to the possibility of a "grand bargain" with Washington, such as the one it had outlined in a secret proposal to the Bush administration in April 2003.

The partners of the US made one more effort to persuade Rice to reconsider the US position at their final meeting in Vienna on June 1 to reach agreement on a proposal. As Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov revealed in a talk with Russian media the following day, the issue of security guarantees for Iran was raised by the negotiating partners of the US at that meeting.

But the Bush administration again rebuffed the idea of offering positive security incentives to Iran. In the final text of the proposal, the European scheme for a regional security system was reduced to an anodyne reference to a "conference to promote dialogue and cooperation on regional security issues".

The Europeans, Russians and Chinese knew this outcome doomed the entire exercise to failure. In the end, only the US could offer the incentives needed to make a bargain attractive to Iran. A European official who had been involved in the discussions was quoted in a June 1 Reuters story as saying, "We have neither big enough carrots nor big enough sticks to persuade the Iranians, if they are open to persuasion at all."

Despite the desire of other members of the 5+1 for a genuine diplomatic offer to Iran that could possibly lead to an agreement on its nuclear program, the Bush administration's intention was just the opposite.

Bush's objective was to free his administration of the constraint of multilateral diplomacy. The administration evidently reckoned that once the Iranians had rejected the formal offer, the US would be free to take whatever actions it might choose, including a military strike against Iran. Thus the June 5 proposal, with its implicit contempt for Iran's security interests, reflected the degree to which the US administration has anchored its policy toward Iran in its option to use force.

As Washington now seeks to the clear the way for the next phase of its confrontation with Iran, Bush is framing the issue as one of Iranian defiance of the Security Council, rather than US refusal to deal seriously with a central issue in the negotiations. "There must consequences if people thumb their noses at the United Nations Security Council," Bush said on Monday.

If the EU-3, Russia and China allow Bush to get away with that highly distorted version of what happened, the world will have taken another step closer to general war in the Middle East.

Gareth Porter is a historian and national-security policy analyst. His latest book, Perils of Dominance: Imbalance of Power and the Road to War in Vietnam, was published in June 2005.
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